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“There Must be Some Way Out of Here”: Why the Convention on the
Rights of Persons With Disabilities is Potentially the Best Weapon in the
Fight Against Sanism
Michael L. Perlin*
New York Law School, New York, USA
It is impossible to consider the impact of anti-discrimination law on persons with mental dis-
abilities without a full understanding of how sanism permeates all aspects of the legal system
– judicial opinions, legislation, the role of lawyers, juror decision-making – and the entire
fabric of society. For those unfamiliar with the term, I define “sanism” as an irrational preju-
dice of the same quality and character as other irrational prejudices that cause and are
reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry,1
that permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants in the mental
disability law system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses.2
Notwithstanding over two decades of anti-discrimination laws3 and, in many jurisdictions,
an impressive corpus of constitutional case law and state statutes,4 the attitudes of judges,
jurors and lawyers often reflect the same level of bigotry that defined this area of law half a
century ago.5 The reasons for this are complex and, to a great extent, flow from centuries of
prejudice – often hidden prejudice, often socially acceptable prejudice6 – that has persisted
in spite of prophylactic legislative and judicial reforms, and – at least superficially – an
apparent uptick in public awareness. I have railed multiple times about the “irrational,”
“corrosive”, “malignant” and “ravaging” effects of sanism, but its “pernicious power” still
poisons all of mental disability law.7
The recently-ratified Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the
most revolutionary international human rights document – ever – that applies to persons
with disabilities. The Disability Convention furthers the human rights approach to disability
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in most every aspect of life. It
firmly endorses a social model of disability – a clear and direct repudiation of the medical
model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of mental disability law. It calls for “respect for
inherent dignity” and “non-discrimination.” Subsequent articles declare “freedom from tor-
ture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” “freedom from exploitation,
violence and abuse,” and a right to protection of the “integrity of the person.”
In this paper, I consider the impact that the Convention is likely to have on sanism. First, I
will briefly discuss both our sanist past and our sanist present. Then, I will consider how the
CRPD has the greatest potential for combating sanism, and for changing social attitudes. In
this latter inquiry, I will also draw on the tools of therapeutic jurisprudence. Then, I will offer
some brief and modest conclusions.
Key words: mental disability law; sanism; international human rights law; therapeutic
jurisprudence; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
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Introduction
When I started writing about sanism, the
potential redemptive influence of interna-
tional human rights law was only dimly on
the horizon. Eric Rosenthal and Leonard
Rubenstein had written their groundbreaking
piece,8 International Human Rights Advocacy
Under the “Principles For The Protection Of
Persons With Mental Illness,”9> in 1993, but
it had been barely mentioned in the law jour-
nals.10 When Rosenthal and Rubenstein first
illuminated how the MI Principles11 came
from “an individualistic, libertarian perspec-
tive that emphasizes restrictions on what the
state can do to a person with mental ill-
ness,”12 they inspired lawyers, advocates,
professors and progressive mental health pro-
fessionals to begin thinking seriously about
the intersection between international human
rights law and mental disability law. This led
me to put on a symposium at New York Law
School in 2002 on International Human
Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of
Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Case
of Hungary.13 This was the first such program
ever put on at any US-based law school.14 In
the years following that conference, develop-
ments moved on with dizzying rapidity.
Disability rights took center stage at the
United Nations, in the most significant histor-
ical development in the recognition of the
human rights of persons with mental disabil-
ities: the drafting and adoption of a binding
international disability rights convention.15 In
late 2001, the United Nations General Assem-
bly established an ad hoc committee “to con-
sider proposals for a comprehensive and
integral international convention to promote
and protect the rights and dignity of persons
with disabilities.”16 This committee drafted a
document over the course of five years and
eight sessions, and the new Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (some-
times “Convention” or “CRPD”)17 was
adopted in December 2006 and opened for
signature in March 2007.18 It entered into
force – thus becoming legally binding on
states parties – on 3 May 2008, 30 days after
the 20th ratification.19 One of the hallmarks
of the process that led to the publication of
the UN Convention was the participation of
persons with disabilities and the clarion cry,
“Nothing about us, without us.”20 This has
led commentators to conclude that the Con-
vention “is regarded as having finally
empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to
claim their rights, and to participate in inter-
national and national affairs on an equal basis
with others who have achieved specific treaty
recognition and protection.”21
This Convention is the most revolutionary
international human rights document – ever –
that applies to persons with disabilities.22 The
Disability Convention furthers the human
rights approach to disability and recognizes
the right of people with disabilities to equal-
ity in almost every aspect of life.23 It firmly
endorses a social model of disability – a clear
and direct repudiation of the medical model
that traditionally was part and parcel of men-
tal disability law.24 It furthers the human
rights approach to disability and recognizes
the right of people with disabilities to equal-
ity in most aspects of life: “The Convention
responds to traditional models and situates
disability within a social model framework25
and sketches the full range of human rights
that apply to all human beings, all with a par-
ticular application to the lives of persons with
disabilities.”26 It provides a framework for
insuring that mental health laws “fully recog-
nize the rights of those with mental illness.”27
The CRPD categorically affirms the
social model of disability28 by describing it
as a condition arising from “interaction with
various barriers [that] may hinder their full
and effective participation in society on an
equal basis with others” instead of inherent
limitations,29 reconceptualizes mental health
rights as disability rights,30 and extends exist-
ing human rights to take into account the spe-
cific rights experiences of persons with
disabilities.31 To this end, it calls for “respect
for inherent dignity”32 and “non-discrimi-
nation.”33 Subsequent articles declare
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“freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment,”34
“freedom from exploitation, violence and
abuse,”35 and a right to protection of the
“integrity of the person.”36
My hopes are, of course, that the CRPD
serves as a vehicle that will finally extinguish
the toxic stench of sanism that permeates all
levels of society. In this paper, I will consider
whether the Convention – ratified or not – is
likely to do that. First, I will briefly discuss
both our sanist past and our sanist present.
Then, I will consider how the CRPD has the
greatest potential for combating sanism, and
for changing social attitudes. In this latter
inquiry, I will also draw on the tools of thera-
peutic jurisprudence.37 Then, I will offer
some brief and modest conclusions.
The title of my paper begins with the first
line of Bob Dylan’s brilliant and iconic song,
All Along the Watchtower,38 a song that cap-
tures the “fragility of the human condition”39
and reflects “the storm of history.”40 Glob-
ally, our treatment of persons with mental
disabilities has spoken to the way we have
ignored (and exacerbated) that “fragility”; the
ratification of the United Nations Convention
is part of a major new “storm of history.” As
Dylan reminds us later in the same song, “the
hour is getting late.”41
Our Sanist Past42
Judges are not immune from sanism.
“[E]mbedded in the cultural presuppositions
that engulf us all,”43 judges take deeper ref-
uge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-
reflective “ordinary common sense,” both of
which continue the myths and stereotypes of
sanism.44 They reflect and project the con-
ventional morality of the community, and
judicial decisions in all areas of civil and
criminal mental disability law continue to
reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes.45
Their language too often demonstrates bias
against mentally disabled individuals46 and
contempt for the mental health professions.47
Courts often appear impatient with mentally
disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in
the legal process to weak character or poor
resolve. Thus, a popular sanist myth is that
“[m]entally disabled individuals simply don’t
try hard enough. They give in too easily to
their basest instincts, and do not exercise
appropriate self-restraint.”48 We assume that
“[m]entally ill individuals are presumptively
incompetent to participate in ‘normal’ activi-
ties [and] to make autonomous decisions
about their lives (especially in the area of
medical care).”49
At its base, sanism is irrational. Any inves-
tigation of the roots or sources of mental dis-
ability jurisprudence must factor in society’s
irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings
with mentally disabled individuals.50 The
entire legal system makes assumptions about
persons with mental disabilities – who they
are, how they got that way, what makes them
different, what there is about them that lets us
treat them differently, and whether their condi-
tions are immutable.51 These assumptions
reflect our fears and apprehensions about men-
tal disability, persons with mental disability,
and the possibility that we may become men-
tally disabled.52 The most important question
of all – Why do we feel the way we do about
these people? – is rarely asked.53
I believe that sanism – along with pretex-
tuality54 – has controlled, and continues to
control, modern mental disability law. Just as
importantly (perhaps more importantly), they
continue to exert this control invisibly. This
invisibility means that the most important
aspects of mental disability law – not just the
law “on the books,” but, more importantly,
the law in action and practice – remains hid-
den from the public discussions about mental
disability law.55
Our Sanist Present56
Although we are more aware now of the
impact of sanism than we were 20 years ago
when I began to write about it, it is not at all
clear that the legal system has made the sort
of structural changes needed to combat
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sanism’s power. I will consider here just one
example: the adequacy of counsel in involun-
tary civil commitment cases.57 I am drawing
on an American case, not because of any
sense of American exceptionalism, but
because I think it is the best example in all
the case law from all the law with which I am
familiar.
The Montana case of In re K.G.F.58 is,
“without doubt, the most comprehensive deci-
sion on the scope and meaning of the right to
counsel in this context from any jurisdiction in
the world.”59 K.G.F. was a voluntary patient
at a community hospital in Montana whose
expressed desire to leave the facility prompted
a state petition alleging her need for commit-
ment. Counsel was appointed, and a commit-
ment hearing was scheduled for the next day.
The state’s expert recommended commitment;
patient’s counsel presented the testimony of
the plaintiff herself and a mental health profes-
sional, who recommended that the patient be
kept in the hospital a few days so that a com-
munity-based treatment plan could be
arranged nearer to her home. The court
ordered commitment. K.G.F.’s appeal was
premised, in part, on allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.60
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the
Montana Supreme Court relied on state statu-
tory and constitutional sources to find that
“the right to counsel . . . provides an individual
subject to an involuntary commitment pro-
ceeding the right to effective assistance of
counsel. In turn, this right affords the individ-
ual with the right to raise the allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging
a commitment order.”61 In assessing what
constitutes “effectiveness,” the court – star-
tlingly, to my mind – eschewed the Strickland
v. Washington standard62 (used to assess effec-
tiveness in criminal cases) as insufficiently
protective of the “liberty interests of individu-
als such as K.G.F. who may or may not have
broken any law, but who, upon the expiration
of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely
bear the badge of inferiority of a once
‘involuntarily committed’ person with a
proven mental disorder.”63 Interestingly, one
of the key reasons why Strickland was seen as
lacking was the court’s conclusion that
“reasonable professional assistance”64 – the
lynchpin of the Strickland decision – “cannot
be presumed in a proceeding that routinely
accepts – and even requires – an unreasonably
low standard of legal assistance and generally
disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.”65
In assessing the contours of effective
assistance of counsel, the court emphasized
that it was not limiting its inquiry to court-
room performance; even more important was
counsel’s “failure to fully investigate and
comprehend a patient’s circumstances prior
to an involuntary civil commitment hearing
or trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical
decision-making between counsel and client
as to how best to proceed.” Such pre-hearing
matters, the court continued, “clearly involve
effective preparation prior to a hearing or tri-
al.” The court further emphasized the role of
state laws guaranteeing the patient’s “dignity
and personal integrity” and “privacy and dig-
nity” in its decision: “‘[q]uality counsel pro-
vides the most likely way – perhaps the only
likely way’ to ensure the due process protec-
tion of dignity and privacy interests in cases
such as the one at bar.”66
After similarly elaborating on counsel’s
role in the client interview and the need to
ensure that the patient understands the scope
of the right to remain silent, the court con-
cluded by underscoring counsel’s responsibili-
ties “as an advocate and adversary.”67 The
lawyer must “represent the perspective of the
[patient] and . . . serve as a vigorous advocate
for the [patient’s] wishes,” engaging in “all
aspects of advocacy and vigorously argu [ing]
to the best of his or her ability for the ends
desired by the client,” and operating on the
“presumption that a client wishes to not be
involuntarily committed.” Thus, “evidence
that counsel independently advocated or other-
wise acquiesced to an involuntary commit-
ment – in the absence of any evidence of a
voluntary and knowing consent by the patient-
respondent – will establish the presumption
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that counsel was ineffective.”68 In conclusion,
the court stated:
[I]t is not only counsel for the patient-
respondent, but also courts, that are charged
with the duty of safeguarding the due pro-
cess rights of individuals involved at every
stage of the proceedings, and must therefore
rigorously adhere to the standards expressed
herein, as well as those mandated under
[state statute].69
On one hand, K.G.F. provides an “easily
transferable blueprint for courts that want to
grapple with adequacy of counsel issues”;70
on the other, no other state court has adopted
its reasoning in the decade since it was
decided. In fact, its rationale was specifically
rejected by the Washington Supreme Court in
an opinion that concluded, with no supporting
empirical or other statistical evidence:
We do not share the Montana Supreme
Court’s dim view of the quality of civil
commitment proceedings, or their adversar-
ial nature, in the state of Washington. The
Strickland standard appears to be sufficient
to protect the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel for a civil commitment
respondent in this state.71
Writing about this issue in a domestic
context, I have noted:
[G]lobally, counsel’s continuing failure here
still appears to be inevitable, given the bar’s
abject disregard of both consumer groups
(made up predominantly of former recipi-
ents, both voluntary and involuntary, of
mental disability services) and individuals
with mental disabilities, many of whom
have written carefully, thoughtfully, and
sensitively about these issues.72
In short, sanism is not an issue that has
gone away. Although, as I have noted
already, it is recognized more and more by
scholars,73 it still remains “under the radar,”
at least for most courts in the United States.
The CRPD
The CRPD in General74
The CRPD is unique because it is the first
legally binding instrument devoted to the com-
prehensive protection of the rights of persons
with disabilities. It not only clarifies that states
should not discriminate against persons with
disabilities, but also sets out explicitly the
many steps that states must take to create an
enabling environment so that persons with dis-
abilities can enjoy authentic equality in soci-
ety. One of the most critical issues in seeking
to bring life to international human rights law
in a mental disability law context is the right
to adequate and dedicated counsel. The CRPD
mandates that “States Parties shall take appro-
priate measures to provide access by persons
with disabilities to the support they may
require in exercising their legal capacity”.75
Elsewhere, the convention commands:
States Parties shall ensure effective access
to justice for persons with disabilities on an
equal basis with others, including through
the provision of procedural and age appro-
priate accommodations, in order to facilitate
their effective role as direct and indirect par-
ticipants, including as witnesses, in all legal
proceedings, including at investigative and
other preliminary stages.76
“The extent to which this Article is hon-
oured in signatory nations will have a major
impact on the extent to which this entire Con-
vention affects persons with mental dis-
abilities.”77 If and only if, there is a
mechanism for the appointment of dedicated
counsel,78 can this dream become a reality.
The ratification of the CRPD is the most
important development – ever – in institu-
tional human rights law for persons with
mental disabilities. The CRPD is detailed,
comprehensive, integrated and the result of a
careful drafting process. It seeks to reverse
the results of centuries of oppressive behavior
and attitudes that have stigmatized persons
with disabilities. Its goal is clear: to promote,
There must be some way out of here 5
protect and ensure the full and equal enjoy-
ment of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all persons with disabilities, and
to promote respect for their inherent dig-
nity.79 Whether this will actually happen in
practice is still far from a settled matter.80
Issues of Dignity81
When the United Nations embarked upon the
drafting process of the CRPD, it established an
ad hoc committee “to consider proposals for a
comprehensive and integral international con-
vention to promote and protect the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities.”82 This
was consonant with the perspectives of observ-
ers such as Professor Aaron Dhir: “Degrading
living conditions, coerced ‘treatment,’ scien-
tific experimentation, seclusion, restraints – the
list of violations to the dignity and autonomy
of those diagnosed with mental disabilities is
both long and egregious.”83
As ratified, the Convention calls for
“respect for inherent dignity.”84 It requires
states parties “to adopt immediate, effective
and appropriate measures. . . [t]o raise aware-
ness throughout society, including at the fam-
ily level, regarding persons with disabilities,
and to foster respect for the rights and dignity
of persons with disabilities.”85 The Preamble
characterizes “discrimination against any per-
son on the basis of disability [as] a violation
of the inherent dignity and worth of the
human person.”86 And these provisions are
consistent with the entire Convention’s
“rights-based approach focusing on individ-
ual dignity,”87 placing the responsibility on
the state “to tackle socially created obstacles
in order to ensure full respect for the dignity
and equal rights of all persons.”88 Prof.
Michael Stein puts it well: A “dignitary per-
spective compels societies to acknowledge
that persons with disabilities are valuable
because of their inherent human worth.”89 In
Prof. Cees Maris’s summary: “The Con-
vention’s object is to ensure disabled persons
enjoy all human rights with dignity”90
In his testimony in support of the UN Con-
vention, Eric Rosenthal, the director of Mental
Disability Rights International, shared with
Congress his observations of the treatment of
institutionalized persons with mental disabil-
ities in Central and Eastern European nations:
“[w]hen governments deny their citizens basic
human dignity and autonomy, when they sub-
ject them to extremes of suffering, when they
segregate them from society – we call these
violations of fundamental human rights.”91
Dignity issues self-evidently affect insti-
tutionalization issues as well.92 An intermedi-
ate appellate court United States case – in
holding that a state welfare department regu-
lation requiring certain patients to receive
services in the segregated setting of a nursing
home, rather than in their own homes, vio-
lated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) – has read the ADA to intend to
ensure that “qualified individuals receive
services in a manner consistent with basic
human dignity rather than a manner which
shunts them aside, hides, and ignores
them.”93 Courts in Canada have similarly
stressed the role of dignitarian values in cases
involving the autonomy of persons with
mental disabilities: “Mentally ill persons are
not to be stigmatized because of the nature of
their illness or disability; nor should they be
treated as persons of lesser status or dignity.
Their right to personal autonomy and self-
determination is no less significant, and is
entitled to no less protection.”94
Again, the extent to which the ratification
of the CRPD actually affects our sorry history
of stigmatization and marginalization will, in
many ways, be the bellwether of the Con-
vention’s actual success.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence95
One of the most important legal theoretical
developments of the past two decades has
been the creation and dynamic growth of
therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).96 Initially
employed in cases involving individuals with
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mental disabilities, but subsequently
expanded far beyond that narrow area, thera-
peutic jurisprudence presents a new model
for assessing the impact of case law and legis-
lation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic
agent, the law that can have therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic consequences.97 The ultimate
aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to deter-
mine whether legal rules, procedures, and
lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to
enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles.98
Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to
look at law as it actually impacts people’s
lives”99 and focuses on the law’s influence on
emotional life and psychological well-
being.100 It suggests that “law should value
psychological health, should strive to avoid
imposing anti-therapeutic consequences
whenever possible, and when consistent with
other values served by law should attempt to
bring about healing and wellness.”101 By way
of example, therapeutic jurisprudence “aims
to offer social science evidence that limits the
use of the incompetency label by narrowly
defining its use and minimizing its psycho-
logical and social disadvantage.”102 In recent
years, scholars have considered a vast range
of topics through a TJ lens – including, but
not limited to, all aspects of mental disability
law, domestic relations law, criminal law and
procedure, employment law, gay rights law,
and tort law.103 As Ian Freckelton has noted,
“it is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive
perspective utilizing socio-psychological
insights into the law and its applications.”104
TJ is also part of a growing comprehensive
movement in the law towards establishing
more humane and psychologically optimal
ways of handling legal issues collaboratively,
creatively, and respectfully.105 These alterna-
tive approaches optimize the psychological
well-being of individuals, relationships, and
communities dealing with a legal matter, and
acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal
rights, duties, and obligations. In its aim to
use the law to empower individuals, enhance
rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic
jurisprudence has been described as “a sea-
change in ethical thinking about the role of
law. . . a movement towards a more distinctly
relational approach to the practice of law. . .
which emphasises psychological wellness
over adversarial triumphalism.”106 That is, TJ
supports an ethic of care.107
One of the central principles of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence is a commitment to dignity.
Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three
Vs” (voice, validation and voluntariness),108
arguing:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty
basic: litigants must have a sense of voice
or a chance to tell their story to a decision
maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal
has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken
seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant
feels a sense of validation. When litigants
emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense
of voice and validation, they are more at
peace with the outcome. Voice and valida-
tion create a sense of voluntary participa-
tion, one in which the litigant experiences
the proceeding as less coercive. Specifi-
cally, the feeling on the part of litigants that
they voluntarily partook in the very process
that engendered the end result or the very
judicial pronunciation that affects their own
lives can initiate healing and bring about
improved behavior in the future. In general,
human beings prosper when they feel that
they are making, or at least participating in,
their own decisions.109
I believe that TJ has the best capacity to
rid the law of sanism and pretextuality. Else-
where, in a book-length treatment of the
insanity defense, I have written:
[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic
jurisprudence principles to each aspect of
the insanity defense. We need to take what
we learn from therapeutic jurisprudence to
strip away sanist behavior, pretextual rea-
soning and teleological decision making
from the insanity defense process. This
would enable us to confront the pretextual
use of social science data in an open and
meaningful way.110
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I believe that the same principles also
apply to the subject-matter of this paper.
Janet Lord and her colleagues focus on the
significance of “voice accountability” in the
drafting of the CRPD.111 The application of
TJ enhances the likelihood that the “silenced”
voices will be heard.112
Conclusion
The CRPD, at base, is a document that seeks
to eradicate and eviscerate “stigmas and ster-
eotypes,”113 and that emphasizes and upholds
the “social inclusion [and] anti-stigma
agenda.”114 It reflects the view of Canadian
human rights activists that “only positive
state action can combat the deeply entrenched
patterns of disability disadvantage arising
from stigma, devaluation, stereotyping and
exclusion.”115 Its purpose is to “combat com-
bat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful prac-
tices relating to persons with disabilities.”116
It is also a document that demands law
reform at the local and national level all over
the world,117 whether in the United States or
on the tiny island nation of Vanuatu.118
Although much of its framework was inspired
by the principles and concepts in the ADA,119
the CRPD goes far beyond the ADA in its
positive mandates, its focus on stigma and
prejudice, its uncompromising adoption of
the social model, its reporting requirements,
and its identification of the specific steps that
states must take to ensure an environment for
the enjoyment of human rights (awareness
raising, ensuring accessibility, ensuring pro-
tection and safety in situations of risk and
humanitarian emergencies, promoting access
to justice, ensuring personal mobility,
enabling habilitation and rehabilitation, and
collecting statistics and data).120 It also – per-
haps most importantly – makes visible what
has long been “invisible to the world’s politi-
cal, social and economic process.”121
Mary Donnelly was precisely accurate
when she argued that “the goal of [mental dis-
ability] law reform must include delivery on
the right. . . to dignity.”122 I believe that the
CRPD has the capacity to do this, but only if
signatory nations grasp the extent to which
sanism has pervaded all mental disability law
policy and enforcement over the centuries.
This is an important challenge for jurisdic-
tions such as Victoria in Australia, which are
currently embarked upon reform of their
mental health legislation. I believe that the
application of TJ principles will, finally,
allow us to see this and to, I hope, make this
truly the “dawn of a new era.”123
All Along the Watchtower (to end by
returning to my title) is the most played of
Dylan’s songs.124 One popular analysis sug-
gests it reflects what he sees as a “loss of
humanity” and Dylan’s resentment at
“society’s arrogance.”125 We have, since
time immemorial, through the device of san-
ism treated persons with mental disabilities –
especially those institutionalized” with
“arrogance” in way that reveals a “loss of
humanity.” Perhaps, the CRPD will finally,
and redemptively, offer us “a way out of
here.”
Acknowledgement
The author thanks Bernadette McSherry for inspir-
ing the paper’s title.
Notes
1 The word “sanism” was, to the best of my
knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton Birn-
baum. See Morton Birnbaum, “The Right to
Treatment: Some Comments on Its Devel-
opment” in Frank Ayd (ed), Medical, Moral
and Legal Issues in Health Care (Williams
& Wilkins, 1974) 97, 105; see also Koe v.
Califano F.2d 761, 764 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1978).
I have relied on the term constantly for the
past 20 years to explain the roots of our atti-
tudes towards persons with mental disabil-
ities. See for example Michael L. Perlin,
Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth: San-
ism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Men-
tal Disability Law Developed As It Did
(1999) 10 J. Contemp. Leg. Iss. 3; Michael
L. Perlin, “On Sanism” (1992) 46 SMU L.
Rev. 373.
2 On the way that sanism affects lawyers’
representation of clients, see Michael L.
8 M.L. Perlin
Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and
Crooks: Sanism in Clinical Teaching”
(2003) 9 Clin. L. Rev. 683, 689–90.
3 42 USC xx 12101 et seq.
4 See Michael L. Perlin, “They Keep It All
Hid: The Ghettoization of Mental Disability
Law and Its Implications for Legal Educa-
tion” (2010) 54 St. Louis U. L. J. 857, 857–
58 n. 1 (listing cases).
5 See generally, Michael L. Perlin, “Lepers
and Crooks.”
6 See generally, Michael L. Perlin, The Hidden
Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (Amer-
ican Psychological Association, 2000).
7 See for example, Michael L. Perlin, “‘And
My Best Friend, My Doctor, Won’t Even
Say What It Is I’ve Got’: The Role and Sig-
nificance of Counsel in Right to Refuse
Treatment Cases” (2005) 42 San Diego L.
Rev. 735, 750 (“irrational”); Michael L.
Perlin, “Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disap-
pears: Giving Life to Atkins” (2003) 33 N.
Mex. L. Rev. 315, 346 (“ravaging”);
Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a
Little Girl: Neonaticide, The Insanity
Defense, and the Irrelevance of Ordinary
Common Sense” (2003) 10 Wm. & Mary J.
Women & L. 1, 25 (“malignant and
corrosive”); Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody
Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain:
Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of
Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental
Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia”
(2008) 83 U. Wash. L. Rev. 481, 502
(“corrosive”); Michael L. Perlin, “Things
Have Changed: Looking at Non-
institutional Mental Disability Law Through
the Sanism Filter” (2002–03) 46 N.Y.L.
Sch. L. Rev. 535, 541 (“pernicious power”).
8 Michael L. Perlin, International Human
Rights and Mental Disability Law: When the
Silenced Are Heard (Oxford University
Press, 2011), 11–12.
9 (1993) 16 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 257.
10 A WESTLAW search reveals only eight
citations prior to 2002.
11 The Principles for the Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and for the Improvement
of Mental Health Care are widely referred to
as the “MI Principles.” G.A. Res. 119, U.N.
GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex at
189, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991).
12 Rosenthal and Rubenstein, (1993) 16 Int’l J.
L. & Psychiatry 257, at 260. On the way that
the MI Principles became the “centerpiece
of the human rights based approach to men-
tal health care” in Australia, see Neil Rees,
“International Human Rights Obligations
and Mental Health Tribunals” (2003) 10
Psychiatry, Psychol. & L. 33; see also Terry
Carney, “Mental Health in Postmodern
Society: Time for New Paradigms?” (2003)
10 Psychiatry, Psychol. & L. 12. But see
Tina Minkowitz, “The United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities and the Right to be Free from
Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions”
(2007) 34 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 405,
407 (criticizing MI Principles for not being
sufficiently protective of the rights of per-
sons with psychosocial disabilities, espe-
cially in the context of the right to refuse
treatment); T.W. Harding, “Human Rights
Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Criti-
cal Review” (2000) 101 Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica 24, 24 (discussing how MI
Principles are “basically flawed”; also spe-
cifically referring to the right to refuse treat-
ment). Criticisms of the MI Principles are
discussed in H. Archibald Kaiser, “Canadian
Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of
Redirecting the Ship of State” (2009) 17
Health L.J. 139, 160.
13 (2002) 21 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L.
340. Presenters at this conference included
Rosenthal, Krassimir Kanev, a human rights
advocate with the Bulgaria Helsinki Com-
mittee, Gabor Gombos, head of the most
important psychiatric survivor organization
in Hungary, and Eva Szeli, then Director of
European Operations at MDRI’s Budapest
office. See ibid., 346–8.
14 Major articles based on conference presenta-
tions include Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J.
Sundram, “International Human Rights in
Mental Health Legislation” (2002) 21 N.Y.
L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 469, and Bruce
J. Winick, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
the Treatment of People with Mental Illness
in Eastern Europe: Construing International
Human Rights Law” (2002) 21 N.Y.L. Sch.
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 537.
15 On the singular role of this Convention, see
for example Frederic Megret, The Disabil-
ities Convention: Toward a Holistic Concept
of Rights, available at http://ssrn.co/
abstract¼1267726; and Frederic Megret,
“The Disabilities Convention: Human
Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Dis-
ability Rights?” (2008) 30 Hum. Rights 494;
Michael L. Perlin and Eva Szeli, “Mental
Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution
and Contemporary Challenges” in Michael
Dudley et al (eds), Mental Health and
There must be some way out of here 9
Human Rights : Vision, Praxis, and Courage
(Oxford University Press, 2012), 98;
Michael L. Perlin and Eva Szeli, “Mental
Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution,
Challenges and the Promise of the New
Convention” in Jukka Kumpuvuori and
Martin Scheninen (eds), United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities: Multidisciplinary Perspectives
(Center for Human Rights of Persons with
Disabilities in Finland (VIKE), 2010), 241.
16 (2001) A. Res. 56/168.
17 (2006) G.A. Res. A/61/611.
18 (2006) G.A. Res. A/61/106.
19 On the 20th ratification, see http://www.un.
org/News/Press/docs/2008/hr4941.doc.htm.
See generally, Tara Melish, “The UN Dis-
ability Convention: Historic Process, Strong
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify”
(Winter 2007) 14 Hum. Rts. Brief 37, 44;
Michael Ashley Stein and Penelope J.S.
Stein, “Beyond Disability Civil Rights”
(2007) 58 Hastings L. J. 1203.
20 See for example Rosemary Kayess and Phillip
French, “Out of Darkness into Light? Intro-
ducing the Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities” (2008) 8 Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 1, 4 n. 15; also the statement by Hon.
Ruth Dyson, Minister for Disability Issues,
New Zealand Mission to the UN, for the for-
mal ceremony at the signing of the CRPD, 30
March 2007: “Just as the Convention itself is
the product of a remarkable partnership
between governments and civil society, effec-
tive implementation will require a continua-
tion of that partnership.” The negotiating
slogan “Nothing about us without us” was
adopted by the International Disability Cau-
cus, available at: http://www.un.org/esa/soc-
dev/enable/documents/Stat_Conv/nzam.doc.
21 Ibid., n. 17 (See, for example, statements
made by the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Louise Arbour, and the Permanent
Representative of New Zealand and Chair of
the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive
and Integral International Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Ambas-
sador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the
Convention on Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities, convened by the UN Human Rights




22 Perlin and Szeli, “Evolution and Contempo-
rary Challenges”; Perlin, “Silenced Are
Heard” n. 8, 3–20; Michael L. Perlin, “‘A
Change Is Gonna Come’: The Implications
of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the
Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental
Disability Law” (2009) 29 No. Ill. U. L.
Rev. 483.
23 See for example Aaron Dhir, “Human
Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of
Mental Disability: The Proposed Interna-
tional Convention on Protection and Promo-
tion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons
with Disabilities” (2005) 41 Stan. J. Int’l L.
181.
24 See generally, Michael L. Perlin,
“‘Abandoned Love’: The Impact Of Wyatt
v. Stickney On The Intersection Between
International Human Rights And Domestic
Mental Disability Law” (2011) 35 Law &
Psychol. Rev. 121.
25 See for example Janet E. Lord, David
Suozzi and Allyn L. Taylor, “Lessons From
The Experience Of UN Convention On The
Rights Of Persons With Disabilities:
Addressing The Democratic Deficit in
Global Health Governance” (2010) 38 J.L.
Med. & Ethics 564; Kaiser, Canadian Men-
tal Health Law.
26 Janet E. Lord & Michael A. Stein, “Social
Rights And The Relational Value Of The
Rights To Participate In Sport, Recreation,
And Play” (2009) 27 B.U. Int’l L. J. 249,
256; see also Ronald McCallum, The United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities: Some Reflections (2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1563883.
27 Bernadette McSherry, “International Trends
In Mental Health Laws: Introduction”
(2008) 26 Law in Context 1, 8.
28 See Lord et al, “Global Health Governance”
568.
29 CRPD, art. 1 and preamble para. e.
30 Phillip Fennel, “Human Rights, Bioethics,
and Mental Disorder” (2008) 27 Med. & L.
95.
31 Megret, “Disability Rights”; see Perlin,
supra, note 8, at 143–58.
32 CRPD, Article 3(a).
33 Ibid., Article 3(b).
34 Ibid., Article 15.
35 Ibid., Article 16.
36 Ibid., Article 17.
37 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new
model by which we can assess the ultimate
impact of case law and legislation on men-
tally disabled individuals. It requires (1)
studying the role of the law as a therapeutic
10 M.L. Perlin
agent; (2) recognizing that substantive rules,
legal procedures, and lawyers’ roles may
have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic
consequences; and (3) questioning whether
such rules, procedures, and roles can or
should be reshaped so as to enhance their
therapeutic potential, while not subordinat-
ing due-process principles. See Perlin, She
Breaks, 30–31, n. 233.
38 http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/all-
along-the-watchtower.
39 Oliver Trager, Keys to the Rain: The Defini-
tive Bob Dylan Encyclopedia 9 (Billboard
Books, 2004).
40 Mike Marqusee, Chimes of Freedom: The




42 This section was adapted from Perlin, “Half-
Wracked Prejudice”14–19.
43 Anthony D’Amato, “Harmful Speech and
the Culture of Indeterminacy” (1991) 32
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 329, 332.
44 Michael L. Perlin, “Psychodynamics and the
Insanity Defense: ‘Ordinary Common
Sense’ and Heuristic Reasoning” (1990) 69
Neb. L. Rev. 3; Michael L. Perlin,
“Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism
Mythology of Insanity Defense Juris-
prudence” (1989–90) 40 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 599, 618–30.
45 Perlin, Sanism, 400–04.
46 See Corn v. Zant 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11th
Cir. 1983), reh’g. denied; (1983) 714 F.2d
159 (11th Cir.), cert. denied; (1984) 467
U.S. 1220 (defendant referred to as a
“lunatic”); Sinclair v. Wainwright (1987)
814 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir.) (quoting
Shuler v. Wainwright 491 F.2d 1213, 1223
(5th Cir. 1974)) (using “lunatic”); Brown v.
People (1956) Ill. 134 N.E.2d 760, 762
(judge asked defendant, “You are not crazy
at this time, are you?”); Pyle v. Boles (1966)
N.D. W. Va. 250 F. Supp. 285, 289 n. 3 (trial
judge accused habeas petitioner of “being
crazy”). But cf. State v. Penner (1989) Kan.
772 P.2d 819 (unpublished disposition), at
3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to
defendant as “crazy” or “nuts”).
47 See Commonwealth v. Musolino (1983) Pa.
Super. Ct. 467 A.2d 605, 614 (reversible
error for trial judge to refer to expert wit-
nesses as “headshrinkers”). Compare State
v. Percy (1986) Vt. 507 A.2d 955, 957 n. 1,
appeal after remand; (1990) Vt. 595 A.2d
248, cert. denied; (1991) 502 U.S. 927
(reversing a conviction where prosecutor, in
closing argument, referred to expert testi-
mony as “psycho-babble”); with Common-
wealth v. Cosme (1991) Mass. 575 N.E.2d
726, 731 (not error where prosecutor
referred to defendant’s expert witnesses as
“a little head specialist” and a “wizard”).
See generally Douglas Mossman and Mar-
shall Kapp, “‘Courtroom Whores” ? – or
Why Do Attorneys Call Us? Findings from
a Survey on Attorneys’ Use of Mental
Health Experts” (1998) 26 J. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry & L. 27.
48 Perlin, Sanism, 396; see for example J.M.
Balkin, “The Rhetoric of Responsibility”
(1990) 76 Va. L. Rev. 197, 238 (Hinckley
prosecutor suggested to jurors, “if Hinckley
had emotional problems, they were largely
his own fault”); see also State v. Duckworth
(1986) La. App. 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (juror
who felt defendant would be responsible for
actions as long as he “wanted to do them”
not excused for cause) (no error).
49 Perlin, “Sanism,” 394.
50 See generally Perlin, “Myths,” n. 44.
51 See generally Martha Minow, Making All
the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and
American Law (Cornell University Press,
1990); Sander Gilman, Difference and
Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race,
and Madness (Cornell University Press,
1985).
52 See for example Joseph Goldstein and Jay
Katz, “Abolish the ‘Insanity Defense’ –
Why Not?” (1963) 72 Yale L.J. 853, 868–
69; Michael L. Perlin, “Competency, Dein-
stitutionalization, and Homelessness: A
Story of Marginalization” (1991) 28 Hous.
L. Rev. 63, 108 (on society’s fears of men-
tally disabled persons), and ibid. at 93 n.174
(“[W]hile race and sex are immutable, we
all can become mentally ill, homeless, or
both. Perhaps this illuminates the level of
virulence we experience here”). On the way
that public fears about the purported link
between mental illness and dangerousness
“drive the formal laws and policies” govern-
ing mental disability jurisprudence, see John
Monahan, “Mental Disorder and Violent
Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence”
(1992) 47 Am. Psychologist 511, 511.
53 See Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of
the Insanity Defense (Carolina Academic
Press, 1994) 6–7 (asking this question). Cf.
Carmel Rogers, “Proceedings Under the
Mental Health Act 1992: The Legalisation
of Psychiatry” (1994) N.Z. L.J. 404, 408
There must be some way out of here 11
(“Because the preserve of psychiatry is pop-
ulated by ‘the mad’ and ‘the loonies,’ we do
not really want to look at it too closely – it is
too frightening and maybe contaminating”).
54 The pretexts of the forensic mental health system
are reflected both in the testimony of forensic
experts and in the decisions of legislators and fact
finders. Experts frequently testify in accordance
with their own self-referential concepts of
“morality” and openly subvert statutory and case
law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral stand-
ards as predicates for commitment or that articu-
late functional standards as prerequisites for an
incompetency to stand trial finding. Often this tes-
timony is further warped by a heuristic bias.
Expert witnesses – like the rest of us – succumb to
the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devi-
ces in their thinking, and employ such heuristic
gambits as the vividness effect or attribution the-
ory in their testimony.
See Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice,” 18.
55 See, from an Australian perspective, Ian
Freckelton, “Distractors and Distressors in
Involuntary Status Decision-Making”
(2004)12 Psychiatry, Psychol. & L. 88.
56 This section is largely adapted from Michael
L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer,
Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial: A Global
Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil
Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for
Clinical Legal Education” (2008) 28 Wash.
U. J. L. & Socl Poly 241, 246–49.
57 See generally for a historical overview,
Michael L. Perlin and Robert L. Sadoff,
“Ethical Issues in the Representation of
Individuals in the Commitment Process”
(Summer 1982) 45 Law & Contemp. Probs.
161.
58 (2001) Mont. (29 P.3d 485.
59 Perlin, “Global Perspective,” 245.
60 K.G.F.,, 29 P. 3d at 488.
61 Ibid., 491.
62 Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668 (establishing weak effectiveness of
counsel standard). See generally Michael L.
Perlin, Mental Disability Law: Civil and
Criminal (2nd ed, Lexis-Nexis Publishers,
2002), 261–67, paras 2B–11.2. In Australia,
for controversies about representation of
persons before mental health tribunals, see
Valerie Williams, “The Challenge for Aus-
tralian Jurisdictions to Guarantee Free Qual-
ified Representation Before Mental Health
Tribunals and Boards of Review: Learning
from the Tasmanian Experience” (2009) 16
Psychiatry, Psychol. & L. 108; Ian Freckel-
ton, “Mental Health Review Tribunal
Decision-making: A Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Lens” (2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychol.
& L. 44; Penny Weller, Non-adversarial
Justice & Mental Health Review Tribunals:
A Reflexive Turn, paper delivered to Non-
adversarial Justice Conference: Implications
for the Legal System and Society, 4–7 May
2010, accessible at http://www.aija.org.au/
NAJ%202010/Papers/Weller.pdf.
63 K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 491.
64 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
65 K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492 (citing Michael L.
Perlin, “Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evalu-
ation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Dis-
ability Cases” (1992) 16 Law & Hum.
Behav. 39, 53–54; “identifying the Strick-
land standard as ‘sterile and perfunctory’
where ‘reasonably effective assistance’ is
objectively measured by the ‘prevailing pro-
fessional norms’”).
66 K.G.F., 29 P. 3d at 492–4, quoting Mont.
Code Ann. x 53-21-101(1), Mont. Code
Ann. x 53-21-142(1)), and Perlin, “Fatal
Assumption,” 47; see generally, Michael L.
Perlin, “‘Dignity Was the First to Leave‘:
Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the
Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendants” (1996).14 Behav. Sci. & L. 61.
67 K.G.F., 29 P. 3d at 500.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 501.
70 Michael L. Perlin and Heather Ellis Cucolo,
Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal,
x 2B–11.3 (2012 Cum. Supp.).
71 In re Detention of T.A. H.-L. (2004) Wash.
Ct. App. 97 P.3d 767, 771–72.
72 Perlin, Best Friend, 741–2.
73 See for example Camille A. Nelson,
“Racializing Disability, Disabling Race:
Policing Race And Mental Status” (2010)
15 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 19 n. 63; Deirdre
M. Smith, “The Disordered And Discredited
Plaintiff: Psychiatric Evidence In Civil Liti-
gation” (2010) 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 749, 809
n. 329; Bruce J. Winick, “The Supreme
Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurispru-
dence: Severe Mental Illness As The Next
Frontier” (2009) 50 B.C. L. Rev. 785, 847;
John W. Parry, “The Death Penalty and Per-
sons with Mental Disabilities: A Lethal
Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of Violence,
and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness”
(2005) 29 Mental & Physical Disability L.
Rep. 667. A recent search of the WEST-
LAW JLR database found 152 references to
“sanism” in articles other than those by the
author.
12 M.L. Perlin
74 This section is generally adapted from Per-
lin, “Silenced Are Heard,” 143–58.
75 See Perlin, “Global Perspective,” 252–3,
quoting CRPD, Article 12.
76 CRPD, Article 13.
77 Perlin, “Global Perspective,” 253.
78 On the significance of “cause lawyers” in
the development of mental disability law in
the United States, see Michael A. Stein,
Michael E. Waterstone and David B. Wil-
kins, “Book Review: Cause Lawyering For
People With Disabilities” (2010) 123 Harv.
L. Rev. 1658.
79 CRPD, Article 1.
80 In two articles and a book chapter – all
currently in press – I am examining the
impact of the CRPD on such questions as
the legitimacy of guardianship laws; see
Michael L. Perlin, “‘Striking for the
Guardians and Protectors of the Mind’:
The Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
Guardianship Law” (2013) Penn St. L.
Rev. on juvenile punishment schemes;
Michael L. Perlin, “‘Yonder Stands Your
Orphan with His Gun’: The International
Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Implications of Juvenile Punish-
ment Schemes” (2013) Texas Tech L.
Rev.; and on the importance of mental
health courts, see Michael L. Perlin,
“There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of
Eden”: Mental Health Courts, the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in Coercive
Care: Law and Policy (Bernadette
McSherry & Ian Freckelton, eds, Taylor
& Francis, 2013). See also, generally,
Michael L. Perlin, “Understanding the
Intersection between International Human
Rights and Mental Disability Law: The
Role of Dignity” in Bruce Arrigo and
Heather Bersot (eds), The Routledge
Handbook of International Crime and
Justice Studies (Routledge 2013, in
press).
81 This section is generally adapted from Per-
lin, Silenced Are Heard, 21–42.
82 G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/168
(Dec. 19, 2001) (General Assembly
Resolution).
83 Aaron A. Dhir, “Human Rights Treaty
Drafting Through the Lens of Mental Dis-
ability: The Proposed International Conven-
tion on Protection and Promotion of the
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Dis-
abilities” (2005) 41 Stan. J Int’l L., 181, 182.
84 CRPD, Article 3(a).
85 CRPD, Article 8.
86 CRPD, Preamble, para. h.
87 Dhir, supra note 83, at 195.
88 Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener,
Human Rights and Disability: The Current
Use and Future Potential of United Nations
Human Rights Instruments in the Context of
Disability (United Nations 2002), 14.
89 Michael Ashley Stein, “Disability Human
Rights” (2007) 95 Calif. L. Rev. 75, 106.
90 Cees Maris, A not ¼ A: Or, Freaky Justice
(2010) 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1133, 1156.
91 Sally Chaffin, “Challenging The United
States Position On A United Nations Con-
vention On Disability” (2005) 15 Temp.
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 121, 140 (quoting
Rosenthal).
92 See Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S.
164, for a recent discussion of the role of
dignity in the criminal trial process in cases
involving criminal defendants with mental
disabilities.
93 Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F. 3d 325, 334 (3d
Cir. 1995, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813
(1995); see also, Michael L. Perlin and Deb-
orah A. Dorfman, “‘Is it More Than Dodg-
ing Lions and Wastin’ Time?’ Adequacy of
Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the
Judicial Process in Individual Right to
Refuse Treatment” (1996) 2 Psychol. Pub.
Pol’y & L. 114–36 (on how hearings in right
to refuse treatment cases can enhance dig-
nity values). See also Michael L. Perlin,
“‘What’s Good is Bad, What’s Bad is Good,
You’ll Find Out When You Reach The Top,
You’re on The Bottom’: Are The Americans
with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.)
anything more than ‘Idiot Wind?’” (1991)
35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform, 235–61 (on the
ADA and dignity in general).
94 Fleming v. Reid (1991) 4 O.R. 3d 74, 86–7
(C.A.), as discussed in Aaron A. Dhir,
“Relationships of Force: Exploring the
Legal and Social Issues Surrounding Dis-
ability” (2008) 25 Windsor Rev. Legal &
Soc. Issues 103, 109.
95 This section is generally adapted from Per-
lin, Silenced Are Heard, Chapter 10.
96 See, for example, David B. Wexler, Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Thera-
peutic Agent (Carolina Academic Press,
1990); David B. Wexler and Bruce J.
Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Recent
There must be some way out of here 13
Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence
(Carolina Academic Press, 1996); Bruce J.
Winick, Civil Commitment: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Model (Carolina Academic
Press, 2005); David B. Wexler, “Two Deca-
des of Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2008) 24
Touro L. Rev. 17.
97 For a transnational perspective, see Kate
Diesfeld and Ian Freckelton, “Mental Health
Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence” in I.
Freckelton and K. Peterson (eds), Disputes
and Dilemmas in Health Law (Federation
Press, 2006), 91.
98 Michael L. Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, 683–
729; Best Friend; Expecting Rain.
99 Bruce J. Winick, “Forward: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing With
Victims of Crime” (2009) 33 Nova L. Rev.
535, 535.
100 David B. Wexler, “Practicing Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and
Strategies” in Daniel P. Stolle, David B.
Wexler and Bruce J. Winick (eds), Practic-
ing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a
Helping Profession (Carolina Academic
Press, 2000), 45–68.
101 Bruce Winick, “A Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Model for Civil Commitment” in
Kate Diesfeld and Ian Freckelton (eds),
Involuntary Detention and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence: International Perspective
on Civil Commitment (Ashgate, 2003),
23, 26
102 Claire B. Steinberger, “Persistence and
Change In The Life Of The Law: Can
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Make A Differ-
ence?” (2003) 27 Law & Psychol. Rev.
55, 65.
103 Perlin, Sanism Filter; on its potential appli-
cation to international law issues in general,
see Roberto P. Aponte Toro, “Sanity in
International Relations: An Experience on
Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (1999) 30 U.
Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 659.
104 Ian Freckelton, “Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The
Price and Risks of Influence” (2008) 30 T.
Jefferson L. Rev. 575, 582.
105 Susan Daicoff, “The Role of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Within The Comprehensive
Law Movement” in Stolle et al. Law as a
Helping Profession, 365–92.
106 Warren Brookbanks, “Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework”
(2001) 8 J.L. & Med. 328, 329–330.
107 Warren Brookbanks, “Chapter 12” in Ber-
nadette McSherry and Ian Freckelton (eds),
Coercive Care: Rights, Law and Policy
(Routledge 2013).
108 Amy D. Ronner, “The Learned-Helpless
Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bar-
tleby Syndrome” (2008) 24 Touro L. Rev.
601, 627.
109 Amy D. Ronner, “Songs of Validation,
Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and
Juveniles” (2002) 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 89,
94–5; see generally, Amy D. Ronner, Law,
Literature and Therapeutic Jurisprudence
(Carolina Academic Press, 2010).
110 Perlin, Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense
443; Perlin, “They Keep It All Hid,” 876:
“To teach mental disability law meaning-
fully, it is necessary to teach about the core
characteristics that contaminate it (sanism
and pretextuality), to teach about the cogni-
tive approaches that distort it (false ordinary
common sense and cognitive-simplifying
heuristics), and to teach the school of juris-
prudence that can optimally redeem [TJ].”
111 Lord, Suozzi & Taylor, supra note 25, at
567. On the role of “voice” in other similar
UN Conventions, see Aisling Parkes,
“Tokenism Versus Genuine Participation:
Children’s Parliaments and the Right of the
Child to be Heard Under International Law”
(2008) 16 Williamette J. Int’l L. & Disp.
Resol. 1, 16 (discussing how children’s
“voices are all too often frequently over-
looked and undervalued”).
112 On the relationship between TJ and interna-
tional human rights law, see Perlin, Silenced
Are Heard, 203–18.
113 Janet E. Lord and Michael A. Stein, The
Domestic Incorporation of Human Rights
Law and the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(2008) 83 Wash. L. Rev. 449, 475.
114 Fennell, Human Rights, 107.
115 Ena Chadha and C. Tess Sheldon, “Promoting
Equality: Economic and Social Rights for Per-
sons with Disabilities under Section 15”
(2004) 16 Nat’l J. Const’l L. 27, 42.
116 CRPD, Article 8.
117 On the law reform obligations of the CRPD,
see Lord and Stein, Domestic Incorporation,
471.
118 See Paul Harpur and Richard Bales, “The
Positive Impact of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Case
Study on the South Pacific and Lessons
from the U.S. Experience” (2010) 37 N. Ky.
L. Rev. 363 (making this comparison).
14 M.L. Perlin
119 See Janet Lord, “The U.N. Disability Con-
vention: Creating Opportunities for Partic-
ipation” Business Law Today (May/June
2010), 23, 24.
120 See Perlin, Silenced Are Heard, 144–52;
“Guardians”; “Yonder”; Perlin, Gates of
Eden.
121 Peter Blanck, “‘The Right to Live in the
World’: Disability Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow” (2008) 13 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.
R. 367, 401.
122 Mary Donnelly, “From Autonomy To Dig-
nity: Treatment For Mental Disorders and
The Focus For Patient Rights” (2008) 26
Law in Context 37, 57.
123 Perlin, “A Change Is Gonna Come”, supra
note 22, at 498.
124 He has sung it, as of the end of his 2012 tour,




There must be some way out of here 15
